Starting with Frege’s sense–reference distinction, this entry introduces disputes over descriptions, direct reference, and causal chains of naming.
1.One object, different modes of presentation
If meaning were only an object, co-referring names could always be substituted without loss. Yet discovering that the Morning Star is the Evening Star is informative. Frege therefore distinguishes a referent from the way it is presented—its sense.
2.Does a name hide a description?
Description theories say a name picks out an object through associated identifying claims. Direct-reference theories note that speakers can be mistaken about most features and still refer successfully. Kripke explains this through a causal–historical chain of naming and transmission.
3.Major Positions
Sense and reference
Expressions reach objects through modes of presentation that explain cognitive value.
Descriptivism
Reference is fixed by a set of identifying descriptions associated with a name.
Direct reference
Names refer through naming and transmission chains rather than equivalent descriptions.
4.Primary & Further Reading
- Frege, Gottlob, 1892, “On Sense and Reference.”
- Russell, Bertrand, 1905, “On Denoting.”
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Reference”. ↗
When citing a dynamic encyclopedia entry, prefer a fixed archive edition and record its version information.