From Humean regularity to counterfactual and interventionist accounts, this entry asks whether causation is a structure of the world, a tool of explanation, or both.
1.From ‘after’ to ‘because’
A match lights after it is struck, but temporal order alone does not establish causation. Causal judgment adds a dependence claim: without the relevant condition, would the effect still occur? Counterfactual theories compare possible situations; interventionist theories ask whether deliberately changing the cause would systematically change the effect.
2.Complications a theory must survive
Overdetermination, omitted variables, and common causes can defeat simple counterfactual tests. Mechanistic accounts therefore demand an intermediate process, though critics ask whether mechanisms themselves can be defined without causal vocabulary. A theory of causation earns its value in scientific explanation and decision-making.
3.Major Positions
Regularity
Causation consists in stable, generalizable patterns among events.
Counterfactual
Had the cause not occurred, the effect would not have occurred in relevant possible situations.
Interventionism
Changing the cause changes the effect in a systematic way, supporting control and explanation.
4.Primary & Further Reading
- Hume, David, 1748, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
- Lewis, David, 1973, “Causation.”
- Woodward, James, 2003, Making Things Happen.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Metaphysics of Causation”. ↗
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